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TAXING LESBIANSt
PATRICIA A. CAIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In his scholarship, and especially in his recent book Taxing
Women,' Professor Edward McCaffery argues that the United States
tax law unfairly burdens women. The women at the center of his cri-
tique are working women who are married. McCaffery has identified
the disincentives such women face when deciding whether to enter the
workplace. He has done so in more detail than any other scholar who
has addressed this issue.2 His work presents a valuable critique of cur-
rent tax policy as it affects married working women, especially those
who are also mothers. His careful delineation between the "marriage
penalty" which increases the tax burden for all two-earner married
couples and the bias against the "secondary earner," which is almost
always the wife, refocuses the debate over taxation and the family so
that the concerns of women are made central.3 I am honored to be
part of a symposium celebrating his work and I commend the editors
of this journal for their decision to make the taxation of women a
more visible concern for feminist scholarship.
In this Essay, I am concerned with women who have remained
invisible in most of the feminist scholarship dealing with tax law. The
women at the center of my analysis are lesbian couples who share a
life of commitment and love. They are not threatened by the marriage
t © 1997 Patricia A. Cain.
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
1. EDWARD McCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997).
2. MeCaffery's work builds on -the work of early feminist critiques of gender bias in the
Code. See Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 Bu'v. L. REv. 49 (1972), for a feminist critique of the male-
centered workplace. For another early feminist critique of the male values embedded in the
workplace, see Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work Welfare and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U.
PA. L. REv. 1249 (1983).
3. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. Rnv. 983 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Equality, of the Right
Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 289 (1996).
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tax penalty because they cannot marry.4 At the same time, single-
earner lesbian couples cannot take advantage of the income splitting
effects of joint returns. The law generally refuses to recognize their
relationships5 and the tax law is no different. Every year when they
file income tax returns, they are required to fill out forms that force
them into separate spheres from each other as though their lives were
lived separately. When one partner dies, federal and state transfer
taxes impose heavy burdens that, absent careful planning, can prevent
the survivor from continuing her established standard of living. These
tax burdens are increased when there are dependent children in the
lesbian household.
The tax law has never been well designed to account for personal
relationships. Spouses and lovers do not bargain for exchanges in the
same way that buyers and sellers in an established marketplace do.
Yet our tax law often treats spouses and lovers no differently from
buyers and sellers.6 Our tax law also has a difficult time distinguishing
between gifts, income, and support when transfers are made between
family members or persons in similar close relationships. 7 Statutory
solutions have diminished the problem for spouses.8 But for unmar-
ried couples, and in particular for lesbian and gay couples who cannot
4. There is a case pending in Hawaii that might change this state of the law, at least for
Hawaiian lesbians. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the state may
only limit marriage to opposite-sex couples if it can demonstrate a compelling reason for doing
so). On remand, the trial court held that the state had failed to present a compelling justifica-
tion. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Cir. Ct. Haw. Dec. 3, 1996). The case is currently on
appeal. However, in 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which
amended the United States Code to provide that in any Act of Congress or any administrative
agency's interpretation of such Acts, the word "marriage" means "only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife." Pub. L. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
Assuming that DOMA withstands constitutional attack, this means that same-sex marriages will
be recognized only for state tax purposes and not for federal tax purposes.
5. For an article on what is at stake in the failure to recognize lesbian and gay families, see
Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L.
& POL'Y 107 (1996).
6. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) (treating a transfer of appreciated stock
at divorce in exchange for the wife's release of marital rights as though it were a taxable sale of
the stock). I have criticized this case elsewhere as adhering to the "fallacy of individualism." See
Patricia Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & SEXUALrrY 97, 102-05
(1991). Congress reversed the Davis holding in 1984 when it enacted what is now I.R.C. § 1041
(1996). See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421, 98 Stat. 494. Section 1041,
however, only applies to spouses or ex-spouses.
7. Compare Pascarelli v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1082 (1971) (payments in exchange for
"wifely services" are not taxable income) with Green v. Commissioner, 846 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.
1988)(payments for "wifely services" are taxable when collected against decedent's estate).
8. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1041 (West Supp. 1996) (no taxable gain upon intra-spouse property
transfers); I.R.C. § 2523 (West Supp. 1996) (marital deduction for intra-spouse gifts relieves
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marry, the law remains unclear in many cases.' In other cases, the law
is clear and generally disadvantageous. 10
In this Essay, I do not intend to develop a lesbian tax jurispru-
dence that would solve the problems of lesbian couples. Rather, my
intentions are much more modest. I wish to give context to some of
the tax problems faced by lesbian couples by describing some concrete
issues for which the tax treatment under current law is both unclear
and unfair. In doing so, I hope to bring the reality of lesbian lives into
the broader tax policy conversation regarding taxation of the family.
II. LESBIAN COUPLES IN GENERAL
It is difficult to count lesbian couples. Recent census data show
that there are over 3.5 million unmarried opposite-sex couples in the
United States. 1 Although there is no accurate count of same-sex
couples, the Census Bureau, based on recent changes in its survey
questions, has estimated the number at 145,000 for 1990.12 There is no
indication how many of these are lesbian couples.
The 145,000 estimate seems low, especially since it purports to
estimate the incidence of both male-male and female-female couples.
Lesbian couples tend to break up more frequently than gay male
couples, but lesbians tend to be more relationship-centered than gay
men.' 3 There is no reason to presume that in any given year there
would be a greater or lesser number of female same-sex couples than
male couples. And if half the 145,000 estimated same-sex couples
were lesbian couples, then the number of lesbian couples would be
around 72,500.
spouses of gift tax liability); I.R.C. § 2056 (West Supp. 1996) (marital deductions for gifts at
death).
9. For example, if one partner pays for the support of the other are the payments received
taxed as income, as a gift, or as legally enforceable support payments? When partners split up,
how are their rearrangements of jointly owned property taxed?
10. There is clearly no marital deduction for gifts made between lesbian partners. If the
partners agree to hold property as joint tenants with right of survivorship, they must contend
with I.R.C. § 2040 (1989) and similar state laws that presume the property was in reality owned
by the first to die.
11. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No.
60, UNMARRIED CouPLEs, BY SELECTED CHARAcrERIsTIcs: 1970 to 1994 (1995).
12. See Barbara Vobejda, Cohabitation Up 85 Percent Over Decade, WASH. PoST, Dec. 5,
1996, at A15.
13. See PHILIP BLMsTEIN & PEPPER ScIrwARTz, AMERICAN COUPLES 171, 308 (1983).
1997]
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If one uses the statistics from the recent Chicago study rather
than the more traditionally cited 10%, 14 then at least 1.4% of the
women in this country are likely to report some level of homosexual
(or bisexual) identity.' 5 The current adult female population of the
United States is around 100 million. 6 If 1.4% identify as lesbian, then
there are 1.4 million lesbians. If all of these lesbians lived in couples,
the number of couples would be 700,000.17 If only half lived in
couples, the number would be 350,000. The Census Bureau estimate
seems low by comparison.
Of these couples, however many there are, a substantial number
are likely to have children. Estimates range from thirty to forty per-
cent. 8 There is no question that the occurrence of lesbian couples
raising children is on the increase.' 9 In many cases, these children are
planned by the two women who form the couple. Artificial insemina-
tion is the means used to impregnate one of the women. Sometimes
the sperm is obtained from a sperm bank and sometimes it is obtained
from a male friend. In both cases, the intent of the lesbian couple is
that the child will be their joint child, raised by the two of them
14. The Kinsey study, famous for its estimate that 10% of the male population is "more or
less exclusively homosexual," has been under attack in more recent studies. See EDWARD 0.
LAUMANN Er AL., THE SocIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACrCES IN THE
UNITED STATES 288-90 (1994) (citing to the Kinsey study and discussing the fact that its 10%
estimate is higher than the estimate in other studies). Kinsey did not study lesbians.
15. Id. at 293.
16. The 1990 Census counted 101,324,687 women over the age of 15, broken down into the
following marital categories:
Never married 23,755,235
Now married 53,144,096
Separated 2,676,840
Widowed 12,121,939
Divorced 9,626,577
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES, Table P-14 (vis-
ited 1997) <http://www.venus.census.gov/cdromlookup/884382589.
17. Not all lesbians live in couples. But given the tendency of lesbians to form couples, it is
likely that most women who identify as lesbian will at some time be part of a couple. BLUM.
STEIN & ScirwARIz, supra note 13, at 178.
18. See Peter Bacque, Sacred or Sacrilege? Same-Sex Parents Struggle to Lead Ordinary
Lives, RicwoND TAEs-DIsPATCH, Dec. 3, 1993, at El (statement of Dr. Rochelle Klinger).
19. The increase in lesbian couples raising children is often referred to as the lesbian baby
boom. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Thomas S. v. Robin Y.: Brief Amicus Curiae of the National
Center for Lesbian Rights; Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund; Gay and Lesbian Advo.
cates and Defenders; Center Kids; and Gay and Lesbian Parents Coalition International In Sup-
port of Respondent-Appellee, 22 N.Y.U. Rlv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 213, 219n.2 (1996). The
lesbian baby boom has also been written up in newspapers across the country. See, e.g., Gina
Kolata, Lesbian Partners Find the Means to Be Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1989, at A13; Lydia
Martin, Lesbian Baby Boom, Cm. Tim., Jan. 1, 1997, at 7.
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together, with the two of them equally responsible for the child's
welfare.
Lesbian couples form households as various as those formed by
married couples. Some may pool income and resources while others
keep assets and income separate. Some plan to live together forever
while some are clear about the short-term nature of their relationship.
Often, as with married couples, the terms of the relationship are not
spelled out and thus expectations of the partners may differ. None-
theless, everyday transactions in lesbian households, such as the lend-
ing of property or money, or the payment by one partner for
consumables that are shared by both partners, mirror in intent and
consequence similar transactions in married couple households. The
Internal Revenue Code, however, does not recognize the household
as a legal entity, but only the legally married couple."° Thus, the real-
ity of lesbian households is ignored under current tax law.
Ill. TAXATION OF LESBIAN COUPLES
A. THE CASE OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE TAX LAW
There are no special rules for taxing lesbian couples. Just like any
unmarried couple, the lesbian couple can rely by analogy on cases that
have been decided for husbands and wives. They cannot rely on spe-
cial statutes designed for spouses. Thus, the partners in a lesbian
couple who agree to pool income cannot shift the tax burden from the
earner of the income to the non-earner. This is as true for husbands
and wives"' as it is for unrelated taxpayers who live together in a com-
mitted relationship.
What is not clear for lesbian couples is the tax treatment of intra-
couple transfers of property. While Lucas v. Earl22 decided that Mr.
Earl could not shift income tax liability to Mrs. Earl, it did not decide
the income tax consequences to Mrs. Earl of receipt of the pooled
income benefit. Some scholars have argued that income pooling
might create a double tax burden: a tax on the earner and a second tax
20. Marjorie Kornhauser makes a similar point in Love, Money, and the IRS: Family,
Income Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HAsniNGs L.J. 63 (1993).
21. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (holding that an income splitting agreement
between husband and wife would be ignored for tax purposes). The effect of Lucas v. Earl has
been significantly minimized for spouses by the availability of joint return rates which allow
husbands and wives, in effect, to split income between the earner and non-earner.
22. Id.
1997]
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on the recipient.3 Why? Because receipts are presumed to be
income unless there is a specific statutory exclusion. The most likely
exclusion is Section 102,24 which excludes gifts. But unfortunately, we
have a Supreme Court opinion, Commissioner v. Duberstein,l which
defines gifts so narrowly that the definition might not include transfers
made pursuant to a binding agreement to share income. I have
argued elsewhere26 that since such income pooling agreements come
into existence because of love and affection, then any transfers made
pursuant to the agreement are also based on love and affection. Such
transfers are thus gifts, excluded from income.
Although I think such transfers are clearly gifts, it is disturbing
that others continue to suggest in print and at tax workshops that such
payments might constitute taxable income to the recipient. And yet,
these suggestions are not so far-fetched given the Internal Revenue
Service's traditional treatment of couples, married or not. The IRS has
tended to view couples, including husbands and wives, as individuals
who are capable of bargaining with each other in much the same way
unrelated individuals negotiate commercial transactions. In other
words, the IRS often determines the tax consequences of a two-party
transaction by ignoring personal relationships and focusing solely on
individuals as independent actors.2 7 The husband and wife relation-
ship was finally recognized as a special unit with the passage of I.R.C.
§ 10411. But prior case law is available to IRS agents to argue that
lesbian couples should be taxed on their most intimate agreements as
though they were two businesswomen negotiating a business deal.
Because the tax law is completely silent regarding the tax treat-
ment of lesbian couples, the tax consequences of intra-couple transac-
tions is unknown. Absent a statute such as I.R.C. § 1041, which
23. See Mary Moers Wenig, Marital Status and Taxes, in UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE
LAW (G. Douthwaite ed., 1979); Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth, Transfers
Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1240 (1980).
24. "Gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise,
or inheritance." I.R.C. § 102(a) (West Supp. 1996).
25. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278,285 (1960) (quoting Commission v. BoVue,
351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956) (defining a gift as a transfer that springs from "detached and disinter-
ested generosity")).
26. See Cain, supra note 6, at 97.
27. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) (holding that property transfers incident
to divorce could be taxed as bargained-for exchanges).
28. "No gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of property from an individual to...
(1) a spouse, or (2) a former spouse, but only if the transfer is incident to the divorce." I.R.C.
§ 1041(a) (West Supp. 1996).
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covers only spouses, 29 transfers of property between unmarried
cohabitants may raise unexpected tax consequences. Let me give a
specific example of how this silence in the tax law operates with
respect to a problem that arises quite often in the lesbian community.
Example: Ann and Beth have agreed to live together for life.
Ann currently owns her home, having purchased it ten years ago,
shortly after her divorce from Al. Beth and Ann intend to share all
living expenses equally. Ann promises Beth she can live with her in
the home forever and Beth agrees to pay as much of the mortgage and
utilities as she is able. However, since she makes less income than
Ann, she is not likely to be able to pay a full half. None of this is in
writing and of course neither Beth nor Ann has consulted a tax attor-
ney. What are the tax consequences of this arrangement?
There are several approaches the IRS might take. The most
likely approach would be for the IRS to argue that the payment from
Beth to Ann is rent which must be reported on Schedule E. Ann
would be allowed to claim certain deductions in full, e.g., allocable
interest and property taxes, and other deductions subject to the limita-
tions contained in I.R.C. § 280A30 . All of this seems unnecessarily
complex since it is likely to result in no taxable income. But it will
reduce the amount of interest and taxes available for Ann to claim as
an itemized deduction on Schedule A. And if the payments from
Beth to Ann occur in the later years of the mortgage, then there may
be insufficient interest to offset the rental income generated. Ann
would then have to claim depreciation deductions to offset the rental
income and reduce basis by the amount of such depreciation. Fur-
thermore, if and when she sold the home, the IRS could take the posi-
tion that only part of the gain can be rolled over under I.R.C. § 1034
since she was selling both principal residence and rental real estate.
The IRS might also take the position that there is a taxable bene-
fit to Beth to the extent that the fair rental value of the home exceeds
what she is paying for the privilege of living there. If Beth has agreed
to do the grocery shopping or other household chores, a creative IRS
29. Section 1041 also covers transfers between ex-spouses so long as made incident to a
divorce. Id.
30. Taxpayers who rent out a "dwelling unit" which is also used by the taxpayer as a resi-
dence can only deduct the expenses allocated to the rental use and cannot claim deductions in
excess of rental income. I.R.C. § 280A (West Supp. 1996).
1997]
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agent might take the position that the value of the rental use in excess
of what she pays for it is compensation income.3
I prefer a different approach. In my view, Ann should not report
rental income. Nor should Beth report compensation income.
There's no real gain in this fact situation. Two people have decided to
share living expenses according to their relative financial abilities.
They are each paying for the benefits that they enjoy.3" If one of them
makes a payment that does benefit the other person more than her-
self, then the excess payment should be viewed as a gift excluded from
income under § 102.33 The entire transaction arises out of love and
affection. There is no real landlord-tenant relationship here any more
than there is an employer/employee relationship.
Which approach should prevail? Since there is no clear authority
dealing with this situation, the IRS position I have outlined does not
appear unreasonable. And although I believe my approach should
ultimately prevail, the threat of the IRS challenge may be sufficient to
affect the tax position of lesbian couples. Given the vulnerability of
many lesbian and gay couples,34 their tax advisors sometimes suggest
that the wise approach is to file returns which do not connect the two
people. Thus, for example, Ann, who is supporting Beth, might
forego claiming a dependency exemption,35 even though she may be
legally entitled to claim Beth as a dependent under § 152(a)(9) 36.
31. The IRS made a similar argument in a case in which ex-spouses decided to live together
and the ex-husband paid household expenses. The commissioner argued that the relationship
was one of employer/employee, as the ex-wife was responsible for housekeeping. The court
disagreed. See Kieffer v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 681 (1987).
32. For example, if Beth pays half of the grocery bill and half of the utilities, we can view
those payments as benefitting Beth, not Ann.
33. For example, if Beth is also paying half of the mortgage principal, a debt of Ann's, then
Ann must either recognize income or claim that the benefit to her is a gift under I.R.C. § 102
(West Supp. 1996).
34. Many lesbian and gay couples are closeted and thus unwilling to fight the IRS when an
issue is raised regarding tax liability.
35. The dependency exemption has been contested by the IRS when the payments to the
dependent can be characterized as compensation for services rendered. See Kieffer, 53 T.C.M. at
681; Peacock v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 177 (1978); Limpert v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.
447 (1961); Hamilton v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 927, 928 (1960). Although the cases usually only
involve the person claiming the deduction, the recharacterization of payments as compensation
could subject the payor to FICA and FUTA taxes. See Rev. Rul. 54-572, 1954-2 C.B. 341; Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 78-39-127 (July 20, 1978).
36. Ann can claim Beth as her dependent for tax purposes so long as she provides over half
of Beth's support, Beth is a member of Ann's household for the full tax year, and Beth's gross
income is less than the exemption amount. I.R.C. §§ 151(c) and 152(a)(9) (West Supp. 1996).
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The result, then, of uncertainty and silence in the tax law, is that a
class of persons (e.g., lesbian couples) may well over-report their taxa-
ble income. This occurs in part because lesbian couples have greater
reason to fear challenges from the IRS than do other couples.
B. THE CASE OF CERTAIN AND UNFAVORABLE TAX LAW
Consider again the case of Ann and Beth. Assume that Ann
earns $50,000 a year and that they decide to have a child. Since Beth
is earning less than Ann, they decide that it will be better for Beth to
become pregnant. Her absence from work will cost the couple less in
lost income. Thus, they plan for Beth not only to give birth, but also
to stay at home and raise the child. Because they use a sperm bank,
there is no identifiable father. The two women agree to raise the child
together and Ann agrees to support both Beth and the child.
Compare their situation to that of Arnold and Betty, who are also
cohabitating outside of marriage and who decide to have a child.
Both of them are recognized as parents of the child and agree to raise
the child together. Arnold, who earns $50,000 a year, agrees to sup-
port both Betty and the child.
What is the tax payable by each couple? It will depend on two
things: (1) whether Arnold and Ann can claim the members of their
households as dependents, and (2) whether they can claim head of
household filing status rather than single filing status.
So long as Ann is providing over half the support for both Beth
and their child, she should be able to claim them both as depen-
dents.37 If Beth's gross income exceeds the exemption amount,38 the
exemption for her will be lost. Also, if the child's gross income
exceeds the exemption amount, that exemption will be lost. Similarly,
Arnold can claim an exemption for Betty and for their child. The only
difference in the two cases is that if Arnold's child has gross income in
excess of the exemption amount, he will not forfeit the dependency
exemption.3 9
37. See id.
38. The exemption amount in the Code is $2,000, but it is adjusted annually for inflation.
All computations in this Essay will be based on the amounts as stated in the Code, unadjusted
for inflation. I.R.C. § 151(d) (West Supp. 1996).
39. See I.R.C. § 151(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1996) (dependency exemptions for children
under age 19 and for children who are students under age 24 are not contingent upon child's
gross income). This provision only applies to children of the taxpayer. Although a child can
include a "stepchild," I do not believe the IRS or the courts will read the definition of
1997]
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If we assume that Ann and Arnold have no deductions other than
the personal and dependency exemptions, then we can compare their
ultimate tax liability. They will both claim the standard deduction
rather than itemized personal deductions.
At this point it becomes crucial to determine whether Ann can
claim head of household status. To claim head of household, she must
maintain as her home a household which serves as the principal place
of abode for more than half the year of a person whom she can claim
as a dependent. Under my assumed facts, Ann does maintain a
household because she provides over half the cost of the home.40 It is
also her home because she lives there. And it is also the home of two
people whom she can claim as dependents, Beth and their child.
However, if the only reason she can claim Beth and the child as
dependents is because they fit the definition of § 152(a)(9), then Ann
will not be allowed to claim head of household status.4 ' Since neither
Beth nor the child are related to her, she cannot claim them except
under § 152(a)(9). Her only argument will be that Beth's child is her
stepchild, 42 an argument that is not likely to prevail.
Arnold can claim head of household status. Although he claims
Betty as a dependent solely on the basis of § 152(a)(9), the child is his
own. Section 2(b)(1)(A)(i) grants head of household status if the
maintained home is the home of the taxpayer and a. child or stepchild
of the taxpayer.43
Using the higher standard deduction available for heads of house-
hold, Arnold's taxable income, after all deductions, is $39,600.44
"stepchild" to include the child of Ann's partner. The term "stepchild" is nowhere defined in
the Code or Regulations.
40. See I.R.C. § 2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
41. See I.R.C. § 2(b)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1996) ("[fqor purposes of this subtitle a taxpayer
shall not be considered to be a head of household ... by reason of an individual who not be a
dependent for the taxable year but for... paragraph (9) of section 152(a)").
42. In some jurisdictions Ann may be able to adopt the child. Adopted children qualify as
children of the taxpayer. However, most adoption statutes are written in a way that normally
prevents two parents of the same sex from adopting. But see Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397
(N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993). These cases recognized the
right of the nonbiological mother to adopt the child of her lesbian partner so that the child would
have two parents. Interpreting the statute to permit both lesbian mothers to become legal par-
ents was thought to be in the best interest of the child.
Alternatively, Ann might adopt Beth. But see In re Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y.
1984) (holding that gay male could not adopt his adult partner).
43. If a descendant of a child or stepchild lives there, the taxpayer may qualify as well.
I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1996).
44. $50,000 minus $6,000 personal exemptions and dependency deductions minus $4,400
standard deduction.
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Applying the head of household rate schedule, the amount of tax he
owes is $7,240. Ann, by contrast, has taxable income of $41,000.45
Her tax bill is $8,607. The difference is $1,367. Ann and Beth end up
paying a higher tax bill than similarly situated unmarried heterosexual
couples.
It is true that much of Ann and Beth's difficulty stems not directly
from the tax law but from state family law. State law does not recog-
nize Ann and Beth and their child as a family.46 Unfortunately, much
of federal tax law incorporates state family law. But tax law ought to
recognize the reality of Ann and Beth's situation. Head of household
rates were intended to give taxpayers who were supporting others, in
particular children, some of the benefits of income splitting. The net
result is to provide a tax subsidy for some parents and not for others, a
result that is hard to explain. Two possible explanations occur to me:
(1) the result is an oversight in that lesbian lives were never consid-
ered when the head of household rules were drafted, or (2) the result
stems from intentional discrimination against lesbians.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lesbian couples face a number of tax difficulties. I have raised
only two specific problems that arise under the income tax. My first
example is illustrative of problems that arise because tax rules are not
clear. My second example is illustrative of problems that arise
because tax rules are clear. Both sorts of problems arise because the
tax law was written with a blind eye toward the reality of lesbian lives.
It is time to take a closer look at the tax inequities that result from this
blindness. As Professor McCaffery has argued, sound tax policy can-
not be based on patriarchal assumptions about who works and who
stays home. Nor should it exclude the reality of real taxpayers who
are working wives, mothers, and yes, lesbians.
45. $50,000 minus $6,000 personal exemption and dependency deductions minus $3,000
standard deduction.
46. In some states, Ann may be able to adopt Beth's child. See my discussion, supra note
37. But at least two states have by statute prohibited adoption of a child by a homosexual. See
FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West Supp. 1997); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN § 170-B:4 (Michie
1996). Nor does state law permit Ann and Beth to marry and thereby create a step-parent/step-
child relationship.
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